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DEREGULATION OF AIR
TRANSPORTATION UNDER THE AVIATION ACT OF 1975
DAVID A. HEYMSFELD*
INTRODUCTION
T HE QUESTION of whether less regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) would lead to more efficient air service is as old as the CAB itself.
For the first 35 years of the Board's existence, the issue was considered
in occasional books and scholarly articles by academics.' Then, almost
overnight, "deregulation" became an issue of national interest.' In the
past year deregulation of air transportation has been exhaustively examined
and debated in a number of forums: in hearings by a Senate Committee,3 in
studies by government officials and private consultants,4 in conferences
sponsored by research organizations,' in speeches by industry executives,'
and in numerous articles and editorials in newspapers and magazines.7 In
October, 1975, the Ford Administration sent Congress the Aviation Act
of 1975, a bill which would substantially lessen CAB control over air
carrier fare levels and entry and exit from markets.8
The objective of this article is to analyze where we are after more
than a year of intensive analysis and debate, with particular focus on the
issues raised by the Aviation Act of 1975. What are the main contentions
of the supporters and opponents of deregulation? What is the main evidence
supporting these contentions? Are there areas in which further study ap-
pears desirable?
*Assistant Counsel (Aviation), Committee on Public Works and Transportation, United
States House of Representatives. The views expressed by the author are his own and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
1 See, e.g., R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORTATION AND ITS REGULATORS (1962); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE
REGULATION IN AMERICA (1970); Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transpor-
tation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965).
2 See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 28747-83 (1975), for a summary of the positions which have
been taken on both sides of the regulation debate.
3 See Hearings on S.2551 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
' See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REGULATORY REFORM (1975) [hereinafter cited as Special
Study]; A PROPOSED MEANS OF EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGED APPROACHES
TO ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM,
CAB Docket No. 28048 (1975).
5 Among the conferences which have been held on these issues were those sponsored in
September, 1975, by MITRE and the American Enterprise Institute.
6 See, e.g., note 16, infra.
7 See, e.g., No Cheers for Decontrol, TIME, Oct. 20, 1975, at 82; Airlines-The Stormy Skies:
Deregulating the Industry, DUN'S REVIEW, Sept. 1975, at 48-51.
8 H.R. 10261, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.2251, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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I will consider three main areas: the effect of deregulation on the
price of services, the effect on the quality of services, and the effect on
industry stability. Several disclaimers are needed. My analysis will of
necessity be broad-brush, since I am seeking to cover in a few pages a
subject which a CAB task force recently discussed intelligently for over
400 pages. Additionally, the questions posed in this paper should not be
construed as indicating final positions on any issues. My hope is that the
questions will provoke further thought and analysis, and a sharpening of
the issues.
EFFECT OF LESS REGULATION ON FARES
The supporters of less regulation (deregulators) believe that loosening
of regulatory constraints on entry and pricing would result in lower fares.
They believe that under a less restrictive regulatory scheme there would be
entry by new carriers, some of which could operate more efficiently than
existing industry members. It is also believed that the threat of entry itself
would force existing carriers to improve their efficiency. Existing or new
carriers might also offer lower fares by operating with a greater percentage
of seats filled, by providing service with older equipment, or providing
service with fewer amenities.9
The opponents of less regulation (proregulators) appear to agree that
changes of the nature proposed in the Aviation Act of 1975 would lead to
some price cutting. However, they argue that these cuts would be limited
to a few dense markets and that the less dense markets would lose their
service or find it reduced in quality. Even in the dense markets the proregu-
lators do not believe that price cuts would stick. In these markets they
9 Cf. Russell, The CAB and the Consumer, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 51, at 56-57 (1974),
where the author, who advocates more stringent regulation by CAB, states:
Competition in the airline industry, nominally a "public utility" industry with restricted
entry (because of route certification requirements) and Board-controlled rates and
charges is intense, but largely expresses itself at the level of predominantly subjective
factors such as, for example, which carrier has the "best" meal service. Any poll of
passengers using competitive carriers would produce protagonists for all competitors,
but the basic results of the poll would bear relationship not to the quality of the food
service, but more likely to the relative use of competing carriers who spend approxi-
mately the same amounts for food service and, in many cases, use the same caterers.
In other words, passengers would indicate a preference for the carrier they use, not
for the food service itself. The same observation would be true with respect to many
other aspects of customer preference such as promptness of response, courtesy and
efficiency in handling reservations, ticketing procedures and baggage check in, the
provision of inflight amenities, schedule dependability, and the return of baggage at
destination. Carriers also compete through advertising, seeking through diverse ap-
proaches to lure customers to their basically similar services. But advertising creates
no basic consumer advantage nor any consumer harm. There is, however, one aspect
of airline competition which has directly affected consumer interests, and that is
competitive scheduling. (footnotes omitted)
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foresee excessive competition, desperate price cutting, and ultimately
the survival of a few large carriers which would raise fares to monopoly
levels.
To some extent, the proregulators are arguing that the benefits of
reduced prices would be outweighed by other adverse effects of deregulation
such as loss of service or loss of stability. These problems will be discussed
later. To the extent the proregulators are directly questioning that there
would be any significant price reductions, they are questioning the possi-
bility of higher load factor or lower cost operations. They are also con-
tending that under a system of freer competition a few large carriers would
have insurmountable competitive advantages which would enable them
to eliminate prospective price cutters from the market.
I believe that there is a need for elaboration of these contentions.
Certainly there is evidence in the other direction. The record of Pacific
Southwest Airlines (PSA) in California and charter carriers in the trans-
atlantic suggest the possibility of higher load factor and/or lower cost
operations. The recent success of the air carrier industry, in reducing costs
and increasing productivity raises the question of whether these carriers
had previously given sufficient priority to cost efficiency.1" The recent
increases in industry cost efficiency have been encouraged by the in-
dustry's financial distress. This raises the question of whether increased
competition is needed as a spur to productivity in less troubled times.
Similarly, the recent cooperation of airline employees in limiting wage
demands raises the question of whether labor costs would be lower in a
less protected industry."
There is also evidence suggesting that larger carriers do not have an
insurmountable competitive advantage. Witness the success of PSA and
the smaller trunks, such as Delta and Continental, in competing with the
largest trunks. The report of the CAB Task Force on Regulatory Reform
concluded, on the basis of existing data and studies, that:
There are no structural traits inherent in domestic air transportation
which indicate superior performance by large-size firms nor are there
traits which would significantly inhibit the entry of new firms into
the industry.'"
10 Between 1969 and 1974, the industry reduced employment from 270,000 to 263,000, while
increasing revenue ton miles from 17.6 billion to 20.8 billion.
11 The pilots of Eastern Airlines agreed to a "pay freeze." Eastern stated that overall savings
to the airline for 1976-77 as a result of the agreement, would total approximately $75 million.
See WALL STRELrr JOuRNAL, Oct. 27, 1975, at 4, col. 12.
12 See Special Study, supra note 4, at 271,
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Although the proregulators apparently disagree with these conclusions,
I have not seen much detailed analysis in support of their position. There
is a need for elaboration of the considerations which lead the proregulators
to a different result.
EFFECT OF LESS REGULATION ON QUALITY OF SERVICE
There are two methods in which air carriers can reduce the quality of
service: first they can eliminate all service to a city, and secondly, they
can take steps short of abandonment, such as reducing the number of
markets in which a city receives service, downgrading service by increasing
the number of stops, and reducing the frequency of service.
The first option, total abandonment of service to a city, does not appear
to be a major problem under the Aviation Act of 1975. Virtually all the
certified cities at which large aircraft service would be unprofitable are
presently served by local service carriers, which receive subsidy for their
unprofitable service. The Act of 1975 does not basically change the stand-
ards by which the CAB will decide whether to require continuation of
13subsidized service.
Would the Act of 1975 lead to a reduction in the quality of service
at a city? A preliminary question is whether under present circumstances
the quality of service is determined by existing law and CAB policies. In
general the answer appears to be "no." Under the present law the Board is
prohibited from regulating air carrier schedules" unless they are so deficient
that they do not provide "adequate" service to a city." The Board has
rarely exercised its "adequacy" powers. Nor do the certificates issued by
the Board control the quality of service. The certificates leave the carriers
with considerable flexibility as to the markets they will serve and whether
they will serve them with non-stop, one-stop, or multi-stop service.
If the law does not presently control quality of service, why would
the Act of 1975 result in a down-grading of service? The answer of the
proregulators is that under present law carriers do not take full advantage
13 Under Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB can permit temporary
suspension of service at a city or the deletion of a city from a certificate, if it is found
to be in the best interests of public. However, the CAB has generally been willing to permit
the suspension of service only where it can be shown that replacement service of an adequate
nature would be provided by a commuter carrier.
Section 8 of the Aviation Act of 1975, would require the CAB to allow abandonment
if replacement service is available or if federal, state, or local government is unwilling
to subsidize the losses from that service. Thus, in the absence of replacement service,
the CAB would decide, as it does under the existing law, whether service at a community
should continue to be subsidized.
14 Federal Aviation Act §401(e) (1958).
15 Federal Aviation Act §404(a) (1958).
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of their powers to curtail unprofitable services. The proregulators believe
that carriers presently choose to provide a substantial amount of unprofit-
able service because they are motivated by a public service obligation to
provide some unprofitable service in return for the more lucrative routes
they have been awarded. The proregulators further believe that if legis-
lation such as the Aviation Act was adopted, carriers would be subject
to so much competitive pressure that they would be unable to continue
to fulfill their service obligations. 6
The Air Transport Association has submitted a study concluding that
37 percent of trunk line, non-stop routes are unprofitable and candidates
for abandonment.1" The deregulators have criticized this study on numerous
grounds, and argue that the study understates the profitability of the mar-
kets studied."8 However, the deregulators have not submitted any in depth
study setting forth their conclusions on how quality of service would be
affected by deregulation. A study of this nature would be most helpful
and welcome.
On the other side of the issue, the deregulators appear to concede
that under deregulation there would be some downgrading of service,
such as more crowded flights and fewer passenger amenities. More detail
on this point would be helpful.
EFFECT OF LESS REGULATION ON STABILITY
As I have indicated, the proregulators believe that the loosening
of restrictions on entry would lead to economic chaos. They believe that
an excessive number of carriers would seek to enter dense markets, creat-
ing excessive capacity. There would then be desperate fare cutting, leading
ultimately to carrier failure and abandonment of markets. 9
16 Robert Oppenlander, Senior Vice-President of Delta Airlines, in a speech delivered to the
Transportation Club of the Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, on March 19,
1975, criticized the advocates of deregulation and strongly asserted:
These advocates seem to overlook that fact that freedom of entry carries with it the
necessary alternative of freedom of exit. The obligation to serve which has long pro-
tected the traveling and shipping public would no longer be there. The effect of this
"freedom" will be immediate and dramatic. Those carriers which now operate in marginal
and non-compensatory markets will quickly drop them. Air service will be lost to
many thousands of secondary markets. Cited in AvIATIoN WEEK, April, 1975, at 7.
17The Air Transport Association submitted the study entitled: ATA, CONSEQUENCES OF
DEREGULATION OF THE SCHEDULED Am TRANSPORT INDUSTRY, to the Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure in April, 1975.
Is See Special Study, supra note 4, App. 4.
19 See, e.g., the remarks of Monte Lazarus before the Center for Transportation Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at 9 (May 16, 1975). "Some critics visualize a host of
carriers freely entering and exiting markets, thereby providing the necessary spur of com-
petition which would keep the system alive and fares low. These carriers - maybe hundreds
as some suggest - would create economic chaos and, ultimately, higher fares because of
excessive capacity."
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The question I would pose to the proregulators is whether they be-
lieve that air transportation is different in these respects from other busi-
nesses? In other words is there something unique in air transportation that
encourages new carriers to enter a market when its capacity would exceed
demand? Are air carriers more likely than other businesses to offer services
at unduly low prices.
A related question is whether the experience of commuter carriers
casts doubt upon some aspects of the "economic chaos" theory. The CAB
special study"0 concluded that the commuter experience indicated that
service was stable at cities which originated 25 or more passengers a day.
At these points there were no gaps in service, although the identity of the
carrier providing service might change. The report recognized that under
deregulation "inefficient carriers would go out of business and be replaced
by other firms." The report further concluded that there was "no reason
to believe that under mature unregulated conditions, business failure due
to inefficiency would be commonplace."'"
Another question is whether the Aviation Act of 1975 furnishes sig-
nificant protection against economic chaos. The Act makes it much easier
for existing carriers to expand their operations than for new carriers to
enter markets already served by the existing carriers. New carriers seeking
to provide additional competitive services would still have to demonstrate
to the CAB that the service was required by the public convenience and
necessity, although the criteria to be used in interpreting the statutory
provision would be changed in a "pro-entry" direction. The Aviation Act
also provides that new entry will be phased in over a period of several
years, and it also gives the Board power to prohibit prices which are below
direct costs.
Another contention of the proregulators is that if there is regulatory
reform, investors and creditors would lose interest in air transportation.
This raises the question of why proregulators believe that investors and credi-
tors would be less interested in an air transportation industry which operates
under free competition than they are in investing in any other industry
which operates under free competition. One hypothesis which should be
explored is whether there would be increased investure interest in air
transportation under deregulation, since CAB regulation is believed by
some to have presented the carriers from realizing a reasonable return
on investment.
20 See Special Study, supra note 4, at 179.
21 See Special Study, supra note 4, at 180.
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In conclusion I again emphasize that congressional consideration
of regulatory reform is still at a relatively early state. As the legislative
process goes forward I hope that both sides will continue to advance the
debate with the same high interest and enthusiasm which they have shown
in the past.
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